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The resurgence ofnationalism taking place throughout Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
raises important questions with respect to ethnic political mobilization, particularly with respect to the 
potentialfor ethnic separatism. Moreover, the region provides scholars an excellent setting in which to 
study the political effects ofconstitutional choices. This article, utilizing a rationalist approach which 
emphasizes the cost-benefit calculus ofethnic groups, seeks to analyze the impact ofone such 
constitutional choice, the electoral system. The competing theories regarding the determinants ofethnic 
separatism are also examined. We find that the most importantfactor in explaining ethnic separatism is 
the basic geo-political arrangement ofthe group, as measured through spatial distribution. 
Within the setting of the far-reaching ethnic resurgence witnessed throughout 
post-communist Eastern Europe, several competing explanatory frameworks have been 
put forth to explain the phenomenon of ethnic separatism. Building on what March and 
Olson (1988) refer to as the "new institutionalism," numerous studies have sought to 
empirically demonstrate the link between institutions and the political behavior of ethnic 
groups (Ishiyama, 1998; Pejovich, 1993; Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1992; 1986; 1974; 
1977). This article, operating on the basis of a rationalist approach, tests the effect of one 
such institution--the electoral system. To what extent does the design of a country's 
electoral system impact the political and behavioral calculus of an ethnic group with 
respect to separatism? To what extent is separatism determined by the other calculations 
about the costs, benefits, and feasibility ofautonomy? 
Theoretical Analysis of Separatism 
Separatism (or secession) is a subcategory of nationalism that refers to an 
organized attempt to establish a separate sovereign state. Premdas argues that the 
determinants of ethnic separatism can be divided into two broad categories: primordial 
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and secondary. Primordial factors include race, religion, values or culture, and territory 
or homeland. Secondary factors serve as the "triggering mechanism of collective 
consciousness" and include neglect, exploitation, domination and internal colonialism, 
repression and discrimination, and forced annexation. Economic, political, and cultural 
conditions can provide the objective basis in which these often subjective variables are 
rooted: 
Group demands are predicated on the empirically demonstrable existence of 
commonalities in individual life experience. In the case of minority groups this is 
determined by the constraints society imposes upon individual members.... 
These structural pre-conditions generate ... demands (Murray, 1983). 
Thus the social, economic, and political setting within which national groups operate is 
expected to have a determining impact on the development of separatist orientations. 
Several theoretical frameworks have been put forth to predict which of these 
societal conditions is more or less conducive to ethnic separatism. One such approach, 
the "revised modernization" thesis, argues that separatist movements may in fact be a 
product of the modernization process (Gould, 1966). According to this approach, with 
urbanization and increased education, previously disparate groups are brought into 
contact and competition with one another, creating a situational dynamic that fosters 
ethnic tension. Moreover, modernization (and the process of industrialization in 
particular) creates the conditions which facilitate nationalist resurgence by introducing 
new infrastructure, transforming the political system, and changing the existing 
distribution of resources. The importance of resource distribution is particularly salient 
in the post-communist context, as the consolidation ofthe "dual transition" to democracy 
and market capitalism is itself a competition for political and economic resources. 
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An alternative framework discusses the concept of "relative deprivation" as the 
primary motivating factor behind ethnic political mobilization (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968). 
Rooted in a psychological perspective, the relative deprivation theory maintains that 
ethnic mobilization is a product of feelings of frustration, aggression, and alienation. 
These feelings, at the most basic level, are a function of a differential distribution of 
resources which leads to a sharp disparity between "value expectations" (in terms oflife 
quality) and "value capabilities" (Gurr 1970). 
Several other theories also emphasize the importance of these sorts of perceptions 
in explaining separatism. The "internal colonial" school, for example, focuses on ethnic 
claims of oppression and exploitation, which depend more on subjective perceptions of 
relative deprivation than on empirically demonstrable conditions (Hechter, 1975, 1978). 
It is important to note that in both the relative deprivation and internal colonial 
approaches, inequality of economic standing and political power can only lead to 
separatist sentiment under certain conditions of collective consciousness--that is to say, 
conditions of conscious frustration. 
Some groups are more likely than others to develop and mobilize this 
consciousness. Important characteristics include the relative size of the group versus the 
size of the dominant cultural pool, the existence of an intellectual and political personnel 
base, the geopolitical arrangement with respect to the group's proximity to kin-states, and 
the relative compactness and concentration of the group within a given territory (Gellner, 
1983; Dutter, 1990). 
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Empirical and Normative Considerations of Proportional Arrangements 
Aside from these detenninants of ethnic political mobilization, another set ofkey 
variables to consider is the institutional structure of the political system. As Mainwaring 
notes, political institutions do indeed matter. Among other things, they "shape actors' 
identities" and "create incentives and disincentives for political actors" (Mainwaring, 
1993). Indeed the ability ofpolitical institutions to structure incentives is central to our 
argument regarding the relationship between electoral system design and ethnic 
separatism. Ultimately this issue of incentive rests on the most basic theoretical debate 
regarding electoral systems: proportional versus majoritarian system design. 
The empirical effects of electoral laws have been clearly demonstrated. Duverger 
proffers a fundamental "law" (Duverger, 1963) which is here presented in a slightly 
modified fonn as a group of two "tendency laws" (Sartori 1994): 
Tendency Law 1: Plurality fonnulae facilitate a two-party fonnat and, conversely, 
obstruct multipartyism.
 
Tendency Law 2: PR fonnulae facilitate multipartyism and are, conversely,
 
hardly conducive to two partyism.
 
Essentially, majoritarian systems make it difficult for smaller ethnic parties to gain 
representation because, barring a geographic concentration of support, they need to win 
pluralities of the vote in electoral districts (Lijphart, 1994). Such parties are therefore 
more able to gain representation in PR systems which do not require first-past-the-post 
showings, but instead allocate seats on a proportional basis. 
This extremely basic empirical showing has engendered an enonnous amount of 
literature on the nonnative merits of electoral system design with respect to ethnic 
politics. While there are "neither widely accepted conclusions nor much conclusive 
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evidence on institutional remedies for ethnic conflict," (Cohen, 1997) several important 
propositions exist within the literature. One such tenet suggests that proportional 
representation and the promotion of "group rights" are effective mechanisms for 
ameliorating ethnic conflict in developing countries (see Osaghae, 1996), particularly 
those countries in the post-communist world (Ishiyama, 1996). The"consociational" 
school contends that representing groups proportionally fosters the integration of as many 
subcultures as possible into the political process (Lijphart, 1974; 1977; Nordlinger, 1972; 
McRae, 1974; Daalder, 1974; Lorwin, 1971). This integration affords the channeling of 
ethnic grievances through democratic institutions and processes, thereby providing the 
group a vested interest in the system. This vested interest in tum leads the group to 
moderate their demands, mitigating against the more extreme separatist variant of ethnic 
political mobilization. Cohen (1997) states the issue succinctly, noting that 
Under proportional arrangements, conflict is likely to take more frequent but less 
intense forms due to the institutional means available and accessible to 
dissatisfied minorities ... They will use moderate means of resistance to effect 
change in the status quo. 
Majoritarian models, by contrast, do not afford and incentivize the institutionalization of 
ethnic grievances. They are therefore inappropriate in ethnically divided societies 
because they "systematically exclude blocs," which is " likely to result in violence and 
democratic collapse" (Lijphart, 1985; Duchacek, 1977). 
Electoral System Design and Ethnic Separatism: A Rationalist Approach 
Another important resource-based approach to ethnic separatism is the resource 
mobilization concept. This notion asserts that nationalism is basically a form of political 
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power struggle over scarce resources. In this sense, ethnic mobilization is a political 
resource and is therefore "rational" in terms of the cost-benefit ratio it entails. 
Building on this theoretical tool, this article suggests that many of the determinants of 
ethnic separatism can be integrated into one explanatory approach: the rationalist model 
(see Becker, 1976 for example). Scholars have praised PR as an effective structural 
mechanism in the management of ethnic conflict. However, there have been few 
systematic efforts to specify the linkage between institutional structure on one hand and 
political behavior on the other. It is here that Mainwaring's argument regarding the 
ability of institutions to structure incentives becomes clear, for it directly relates to a 
critical aspect of the separatism equation: the cost-benefit calculus of an ethnic group as 
determined by a given institutional setting. 
This rationalist approach rests on several assumptions. First we assume that an 
ethnic group can best be described as a collectivity of rational, self-interested actors, 
seeking to maximize their preferences. Second, we assume that the preference to be 
maximized in this case is political power, a concept which entails control over the 
resources ofthe state, including the civil service. And finally we assume that in the 
process of determining how to maximize that preference through the structural constraints 
and incentives afforded by the institutional setting, ethnic groups act on accurate 
information. 
With these considerations in mind, ethnic separatism, like nationalism itself, 
becomes the product not of an emotional outburst but of a rational cost-benefit calculus. 
This calculus is in tum structured by institutions such as a country's electoral system. 
The logic behind this approach to political mobilization is relatively straightforward. 
---.
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Greater proportionality literally lowers the cost of winning a legislative seat. Small 
ethnic parties, with the broader representation and expanded access provided by PR 
designs, have a much greater chance of pressing their claims within the system. Therefore 
the benefits of this vested interest in the political system outweigh the potential costs of 
separatism, an always uncertain proposition. By contrast, in majoritarian systems it 
literally costs more to win a legislative seat. Such systems, moreover, do not facilitate 
broad representation and expanded political voice of minority groups. These systems 
therefore incentivize separatism, as the benefits to ethnic groups would outweigh the 
costs of the political limitations currently imposed by the structure of the system. 
This sort of cost-benefit calculus applies to political, economic, and structural factors as 
well. Political and economic marginalization of an ethnic minority obviously entails 
certain costs. The costs associated with these conditions may be weighed against the 
potential benefits, in terms of improving resource distribution (both political and 
economic), that would be generated by secession. This calculus, furthermore, is 
predicated on a component essential to any cost-benefit analysis--feasibility. Ultimately, 
it is the basic structural arrangement of the ethnic group, in terms of such factors as 
concentration and proximity to kin-states or regions, which is crucial in determining such 
feasibility and therefore crucial in shaping the cost-benefit calculus of an ethnic minority 
contemplating separatism. 
Design and Methodology 
As indicated above, this paper is interested in the relationship between 
institutional mechanisms and ethnic separatism. Thus the focus here is not on all ethnic 
groups but only those groups which are likely to be of a separatist orientation. This 
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typology would include all groups that "define themselves using ethnic criteria (who) 
make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other 
political actors" (GUIT, 1994). Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the cases 
examined are what the literature terms minorities at risk. GUIT defines a minority at risk 
as a group that "collectively suffers or benefits, from systematic discriminatory 
treatment" and therefore is the "focus ofpolitical mobilization and action in defense or 
promotion of the group's self-defined interests" (GUIT, 1994). 
The primary unit of analysis for this study is the "group-year," or the separatist 
tendency of a given ethnic group in a particular year. Following Ishiyama's treatment of 
ethnic conflict management, we have excluded from the sample the Russian Federation 
and all states that were either decidedly not democratic, engaged in a protracted civil war, 
or had no minority at risk population to speak of. This left a total sample of 21 
identifiable minorities at risk and 52 group-years (See Table 1). 
Table 1: Countries, Ethnic Groups, and Group-Years 
Country Ethnic Group Group-Years 
Albania Greeks 1992, 1993, 1995, 1998 
Bulgaria Turks 1991,1992,1995,1998 
Roma 1991,1992,1995,1998 
Croatia Serbs 1993, 1996 
Roma 1993, 1996 
Czech Republic Roma 1991,1993,1997 
Slovaks 1991, 1993, 1997 
Estonia Russians 1993, 1996 
Hungary Roma 1991,1995 
Latvia Russians 1994, 1996 
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Lithuania Poles 1993, 1997 
Russians 1993, 1997 
Macedonia Albanians 1991, 1995 
Serbs 1991, 1995 
Roma 1991, 1995 
Moldova Gagauz 1995 
Slavs 1995 
Romania Hungarians 1991, 1993, 1997 
Roma 1991,1993,1997 
Slovakia Hungarians 1991,1993,1995 
Roma 1991, 1993, 1995 
Operationalization ofthe Dependent Variable: Separatism 
The dependent variable, separatism, is measured using the separatism index 
derived from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Dataset Phase III. The index scores a group's 
political orientation from least to most separatist based on the following coding scheme 
(Table 2): 
Table 2: Measuring Separatism 
Score Description 
1 "Latent" Separatism, meeting one or both of the following conditions 
-Ethnic group was historically autonomous, or 
-Ethnic group was transferred from another state, either physically or 
in terms ofjurisdictional modification 
2 Historical Separatism: The group gave rise to a separatist or autonomy movement that 
persisted as an active political force for five or more years in their region of origin 
(between 1940 and 1980). 
3 Active Separatism: The group has an active separatist or autonomy movement in the 
1980s or 1990s. 
-10 
Independent Variables 
This model weighs the relative importance of electoral design in explaining ethnic 
separatism. An underlying theme of the literature reviewed above is that differences in 
the distribution of society's resources, both political and economic, constitute a necessary 
precondition for ethnic separatism (Emizet and Hesli, 1995). To test the effect of political 
arid economic discrimination stressed by the relative deprivation and internal colonial 
theories, this study utilizes two index variables from the MAR dataset phase III. Both the 
political and economic variables address the interactive effect between the prevailing 
social practice and government policy (See Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 3: Political Discrimination 
0 No Discrimination 
I Historical NeglectIRemedial Policies--Substantial under-representation in political office 
and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are 
designed to protect or improve the group's political status. 
2 Historical NeglectINo Remedial Policies-- Substantial under-representation due to 
historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal 
exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies. 
3 Social ExclusionINeutral Policy--Substantial under-representation due to prevailing social 
practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if 
positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory policies. 
4 ExclusionIRepressive Policy--Public policies substantially restrict the group's political 
participation by comparison with other groups. 
Table 4: Economic Discrimination 
0 No Discrimination 
I Historical NeglectIRemedial Policies--Significant poverty and under-representation in 
desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies 
are designed to improve the group's material well-being. 
2 Historical NeglectINo Remedial Policies-- Significant poverty and under-representation 
in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social 
practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group's 
material well-being. 
3 Social ExclusionINeutral Policies--Significant poverty and under-representation due to 
prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are 
neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination. 
4 Restrictive Policies--Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) 
substantially restrict the group's economic opportunities by contrast with other groups. 
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Aside from assessing the impact of these political and economic detenninants of 
ethnic separatism, this study also examines the role of basic structural factors. Perhaps 
the most basic consideration in this respect is the physical, geopolitical arrangement of 
the group. The obvious reason for this is that collective action of any type requires that 
there be an underlying "collective." A widely scattered ethnic group has neither the 
incentive nor the practical ability to press for territorial reorganization. Thus the extent to 
which an ethnic group engages in separatist activity is largely detennined by the 
logistical consideration of group concentration. This variable is measured using a spatial 
distribution index, once again derived from the MAR Dataset Phase III. 
Table 5: Spatial Distribution 
Score Description 
0 Widely dispersed 
1 Primarily urban or minority in one region 
2 Majority in one region, others dispersed 
3 Concentrated in one region 
Effect ofElectoral System Design 
For the purposes of measuring the impact of electoral system design on ethnic 
separatism, this study only examines the lower houses of the selected countries. Not only 
are the emerging political systems of Eastern Europe and the fonner Soviet Union varied 
in tenns of cameral structure (some are unicameral, as is the case in Albania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and the Baltics), but in all ofthe bicameral systems, the lower house is 
unquestionably the more powerful. Therefore, for the sake of theoretical significance and 
comparability, this article only examines those electoral designs which govern the 
composition of the respective lower houses. 
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Rather than employ the measure traditionally used to determine proportionality-­
average district magnitude (ADM)--this model utilizes Gallagher's Least Squares 
measure of disproportionality (LSq) (Gallagher, 1991). Recall that the primary interest of 
this study is how the effects of electoral system design impact the behavioral calculus of 
ethnic groups, specifically with respect to desires for separatism. Therefore this indicator 
proves to be the most comprehensive as it measures the degree of proportionality 
produced by a given electoral system on the whole. By measuring the total effect of 
system design all ofthe relevant structural features are taken into account (such as seat 
allocation formula, electoral thresholds, assembly size, etc.). The LSq measure is 
calculated based on the following formula: 
L Sq=~ 1/2'2.(V,_S))2 
Where v)=the popular vote share of party I 
s[=the seat share of party I in the lower house 
These four factors-political discrimination, economic discrimination, spatial 
distribution, and electoral system disproportionality-suggest the following hypotheses 
with respect to ethnic separatism: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of political discrimination, the greater the 
degree of ethnic separatism. 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of economic discrimination, the greater the
 
degree of ethnic separatism.
 
Hypothesis 3: The more concentrated the ethnic group (in terms of its spatial
 
distribution) the greater the degree of ethnic separatism.
 
Hypothesis 4 The less disproportional the electoral system (that is, more 
proportional), the lesser the degree of ethnic separatism. 
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Results and Conclusions 
Table six reports the results of regressing the dependent variable separatism 
against the four independent variables in the model specified above. 
Table 6: Model of Ethnic Separatism 
Variable Beta T Sig. 
LSq .084 .683 .498 
Economic 
Discrimination 
-.127 -.944 .350 
Political 
Discrimination 
-.142 -1.118 .270 
Spatial 
Distribution 
.490 3.679 .001 
N=52 
F=6.820 
Sig.=.OOO 
Adjusted R2=.327 
The results prove to be rather striking. According to our model, spatial distribution of the 
ethnic group, the only variable to achieve statistical significance, is by far the strongest 
factor determining ethnic separatism. Not only are the other variables relatively weak, 
but both the political and economic discrimination variables are in the direction opposite 
that predicted. This study therefore indicates that the greater the level of political and 
economic discrimination, the less the degree of ethnic separatism. Disproportionality of 
the electoral system, while in the predicted direction, is by far the weakest of the 
independent variables and fails to achieve statistical significance. 
The findings ofthis study therefore suggest several interesting conclusions. First, 
it is apparent that fundamental structural factors playa huge role in determining separatist 
activity. This makes intuitive sense. A widely dispersed group, such as the Hungarian 
Roma (or Roma in general given that they exist in diaspora worldwide), will have greater 
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practical difficulty in organizing and staging collective action of any sort. A more 
heavily concentrated group, such as the Hungarians living in Slovakia or the Albanian 
Greeks, will be more able to mobilize politically, and they may also have added help 
from co-nationals just across the border. A wide scattering ofpeople does not lend itself 
easily to territorial reorganization, the very definition of separatism. 
A second important point these findings reveal is that one must differentiate the 
conditions associated with the emergence ofnationalist demands from the conditions 
which affect the ability ofa given minority to mobilize around those demands. Both the 
relative deprivation and internal colonial theories suggest that heightened political and 
economic discrimination should yield ethnic separatism. The findings with respect to 
both the political and economic discrimination variables could therefore potentially 
suggest a curvilinear relationship. There may exist an "optimum" point of political and 
economic discrimination conducive to ethnic separatism, beyond which a group becomes 
so marginalized as to not even have the ability or resources to engage in separatist 
activity. This interpretation ultimately affirms the resource mobilization theory of ethnic 
separatism, emphasizing the nature of separatist activity as a political resource which 
requires organizational skills, personnel, infrastructure, and other resources to manage 
effectively. Political and economic discrimination may determine conditions of 
nationalist mobilization, but they clearly do not determine ability to mobilize. 
In a similar fashion, the surprising findings regarding the design of a country's 
electoral system may likewise entail a curvilinear relationship with ethnic separatism. 
Recall that proportionality, through its ability to facilitate broader representation of ethnic 
groups, provides incentives to participate within the existing system of institutions. 
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However, there might exist the potential for too much of a good thing. An extremely 
permissive system of proportional representation could allow for a fragmentation of the 
party system which would result in cabinet instability and deadlock, conditions conducive 
to political mobilization of all sorts--including ethnic separatism. Furthermore, greater 
proportionality allows for entrance of extremist right wing parties, some of which have 
ultra-nationalist and xenophobic orientations. This political dynamic might also tend to 
encourage ethnic separatism if ethnic minorities felt marginalized by the political forces 
on the right. The complicated nature of these relationships and theoretical linkages 
clearly requires further research. 
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